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Fichte, Kant, the Cognitive Subject,
and Epistemic Constructivism
Tom Rockmore
“The absolute self must therefore be cause of the
not-self, 
insofar as the latter is the ultimate ground of all
presentation;
and the not-self must to that extent be its effect.”
J. G. Fichte1
1 German idealism can be understood as an effort by different hands, beginning in Kant,
and continuing in Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and others to formulate a successful version
of  the  constructivist  approach  to  cognition.2 Fichte,  who  is  often  understood  as  a
philosopher  of  freedom,3 further  contributes  to the  epistemic  theme  running
throughout  German  idealism.  This  paper  will  consider  the  nature  and  explanatory
limits of the Fichtean view of subjectivity in the epistemic context of German idealism.
2 Kant’s critical philosophy presupposes a distinctive conception of the transcendental
subject he claims to “deduce” as the capstone of his transcendental deduction. Fichte
defends  a  post-Kantian  conception  of  the  subject.  I  will  be  arguing  that  Fichte’s
distinctive  revision  of  the  Kantian  subject  goes  too  far  in  making  the  objective
dimension of cognition wholly dependent on the subjective dimension. After Kant and
after Fichte we still lack an effective solution for the problem of cognition.
 
1. On Kant, German idealism and Parmenides 
3 In a recent collection of papers on Kant’s transcendental idealism, Dennis Schulting
directs attention to the distinction between “Kant’s controversial doctrine of idealism,
most notably his notion of ‘the thing-in-itself’ and its distinction from ‘appearance’,
which is Kant’s term for an empirically real object but of which he also notoriously says
that it is a ‘mere representation’.”4 The distinction between reality and appearance,
which goes all the way back in the tradition, points to Parmenides early formulation of
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the cognitive problem in terms of the identity of thought and being. According to the
Parmenidean cognitive approach, any cognitive theory must include three elements:
reality, or mind-independent reality, or again what is as it is, what is sometimes called
the really real; then the appearance or, if there is a difference, the representation of
that reality as it really is; and finally a relation of cognitive identity as the normative
criterion  of  cognition.  The  Parmenidean approach further  suggests  the  three  main
solutions  to  the  cognitive  problem  are:  epistemic  skepticism,  then  metaphysical
realism, and finally epistemic constructivism.
4 The influential Parmenidean approach echoes through the later tradition. Plato, who
reacts to Parmenides, suggests two basic points. On the one hand, the forms or ideas
are  not  unreal,  but  real,  in  fact  the  most  real,  or  mind-independent,  eternal,
unchangeable  reality,  and  appearances  depend  on  or  derive  from  them  as  the
subjective manifestation of objective reality. On the other hand, if there is cognition,
then on grounds of nature and nurture some selected individuals at least some of the
time literally “see” reality. 
5 Kant’s view that prior philosophy is dogmatic suggests that, like Descartes, he begins
anew from the beginning. Yet Kant depends in many ways on selected predecessors,
including  Hume  as  well  as  Plato.5 Kant,  like  Plato,  accepts  a  causal  approach  to
cognition,  or  the  view that  reality  causes  appearances.  But  unlike  Plato  he  rejects
intellectual intuition.
 
2. Some contemporary reactions to the Kantian thing
in itself
6 Kant, who thought he was misunderstood, suggests there is no difficulty in mastering
the idea of the whole. But the critical philosophy has always been read from widely
differing  perspectives.  A  central  difficulty  consists  in  the  recognizably  Platonic
problem of how to understand the thing in itself as the causal source of an empirically
real object that is also a mere representation.
7 Kant’s view of reality is shrouded in technical language he often appears to utilize in
imprecise  fashion.  His  two  aspects  approach  to  causality  through  a  conception  of
reality as the thing in itself that can without contradiction be thought as intelligible in
its action and, in his words, “as sensible in the effects of that action as an appearance in
the  world  of  sense,”  hence  as  not  given  in  intuition  as  an  appearance6 has  never
satisfied more than a very few observers.
8 Kant’s contemporaries interpret this view in many ways. Maimon, for instance, thinks
the thing in itself functions only as an object of inquiry rather than as an independent,
noumenal  entity.7 This  approach  leads  to  cognitive  skepticism  since  we  can  never
penetrate beyond appearances to grasp mind-independent reality. 
9 Maimon was countered by various forms of epistemic representationalism ultimately
traceable to Parmenides’ conviction that we know being, or mind-independent reality.
Representationalism and constructivism are incompatible epistemic approaches. In the
critical  period,  Kant  still  uses  representationalist  language,  which  suggests  that
appearances  are  the  visible  side  of  an  invisible  reality.  He  later  moved away  from
representationalism and towards constructivism. In the critical period, Kant suggested
that “representation” could not even be defined. 
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10 In  part  in  reaction  to  Maimon,  representationalist  interpretations  of  the  critical
philosophy  were  quickly  formulated  by  Jacobi,  Schulze,  Schopenhauer,  Beck  and
others. Jacobi, who relied on belief (Glaube), influentially defended realism against Kant
in his book on Hume that appeared in the same year as the second edition of Kant’s first
Critique. His famous aphorism “Without the presupposition [of the "thing in itself,"] I
was unable to enter into [Kant's] system, but with it I was unable to stay within it”8
suggests that Kant must inconsistently know reality he cannot know. Schulze, following
Jacobi, thinks it is incoherent to posit a mind-independent object beyond experience as
its cause. He argues Kant illegitimately relies on causality through the thing in itself
that  is  the source of  sensations.  According to Reinhold,  there is  a  basic  distinction
between the  noumenon,  which is  a  mere  idea  of  reason,  which always  lies  beyond
experience, where it functions as a demand or ought, and things in themselves. The
latter  are  mind-independent  objects  that  are  closer  to  phenomena  than  noumena.
Kant’s student, J. S. Beck, interpreted the thing in itself as merely another way to refer
to the object that appears, as distinguished from a mysterious supersensible object that
does not and cannot appear.9
11 The confused debate concerning the thing in itself point to contemporary efforts to
gain clarity about the Kantian conception of reality. One suggestion is that if we cannot
cognize  reality,  then  the  result  is  skepticism.  Another  is  the  view  that  Kant
illegitimately makes claims about reality he cannot know. A third is to claim against
Kant that the thing in itself in fact appears. 
 
3. Is Kant a representationalist, a constructivist, or
both?
12 I  believe  the  main  interpretive  difficulty  consists  in  reading  Kant  as  either  a
representationalist, or as a constructivist. We can interpret Fichte, while Kant is still
active, as seeking to formulate an updated, revised form of the Kantian view from a
non-representationalist, constructivist perspective.
13 Kant lived in a period dominated by representational, causal theories due to various
rationalists and empiricists. Representationalism is any form of the effort at least as old
as Parmenides to demonstrate indirect cognition of reality through its representation,
in short through representing the mind-independent real. My hypothesis is that he was
initially  attracted  to  representationalism  before  later  inventing  the  so-called
Copernican revolution, since, as he famously writes, he was unable to make progress in
grasping a mind-independent object, in other words on the assumption that the subject
depends on the object.
14 The various representational approaches to the critical philosophy share the view that
we can make sense of the critical philosophy if and only if reality under the heading of
the thing in itself in fact appears. This requires a solution of the cognitive problem
along metaphysical realist lines. Though they are metaphysically realist passages in the
first Critique, Kant is not consistent. In my view Kant’s best moments, are devoted to the
constructivist approach at which he barely hints, which is not often discussed in detail,
but which was recognized by Kant’s contemporaries (Reinhold, Schelling and Fichte)
under the heading of the Copernican revolution.
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4. Kant, Fichte and the rise of the modern cognitive
subject
15 Representationalism and  constructivism  differ  i.  a.  with  respect  to  the  cognitive
subject. Descartes distinguishes at least implicitly between the widely known view of
the subject as a spectator and the nearly unknown view of the subject as an actor. A
representational approach to cognition supposes a passive subject to which something
appears.  A  constructivist  view  of  cognition  is  based  on  an  active  subject  that
“constructs” what it knows.
16 Hegel correctly points out that the critical philosophy “constitutes the foundation and
the starting point of the new German philosophy […].”10 Kant, Fichte, Hegel and in a
different way Marx are all cognitive constructivists. Epistemic constructivism is a view
that  the  subject  knows  only  what  it  can  be  said  to  construct.  The  Kantian
transcendental subject describes the general conditions of cognition in focusing on the
logic  as  opposed  to  the  psychology  of  cognition.  Kant  rejects  so-called  Lockean
physiology,  or  what  Husserl  later  calls  “psychologism.”  Though  Kant  explain  the
general possibility of cognition in general through a transcendental subject, he cannot
explain, despite his interest in anthropology, how finite human beings are capable of
cognition in his specific sense.
 
5. Fichte’s anthropological shift and the thing in itself
17 The Kantian  subject  is  passive  in  receiving  sensation  and  active  in  constructing  a
perceptual object.  Fichte simply drops the thing in itself in featuring an account of
experience in which the cognitive subject is solely active. As Hegel points out, Fichte
explains experience and knowledge through a new view of the subject as practically
finite, constrained in its action by its surroundings, but theoretically infinite, or wholly
unconstrained, hence forever suspended, as it were, between what is and what ought to
be.
18 Kant sketches an account of the interaction of the transcendental subject and reality as
a third-person, causal account. Fichte reformulates the Kantian view as a first-person
account of the interaction of subject and object in a statement of the axioms (Grundsätze
), which begins the initial, most influential version of the Science of Knowledge.
19 According to the modern causal approach to perception, objects “cause” ideas in the
mind that justify a reverse, anti-Platonic cognitive inference from the idea to the mind-
independent object. Kant, who departs from this model, suggests a functional model in
which external reality affects the subject, which in turn constructs empirical objects of
perception  and  knowledge.  Fichte’s  turn  away  from  Kant’s  functional  account  of
subjectivity and toward a new conception of finite human being as the philosophical
subject leads to an account of ontology from a subjective point of view –roughly to a
view of philosophy as systematic but “ungrounded”– and to a view of cognitive claims
as intrinsically circular.
20 Fichte rejects the very idea of the thing in itself as “produced solely by free thought”
and  without  any  “reality  whatever,”11 hence  a  representationalist  approach  to  the
cognitive problem. He indicates his agreement with Kant’s Copernican turn, hence with
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epistemic constructivism, in writing that “the [cognitive] object shall be posited and
determined by the cognitive faculty, and not the cognitive faculty by the object”.12
21 Kant’s  conception of  the subject  as  passive as  well  as  active restates  a  form of  the
Cartesian approach to passive subjectivity as a philosophical fiction whose relation to
finite  human  being  cannot  be  described.  Fichte  reacts  to  Kant  through  an
anthropological reformulation of the cognitive subject as intrinsically active.
22 Through the shift from the a priori to the a posteriori plane, Fichte is bound by the
limits of finite human being. Fichte thinks the concept of a “thing in itself” as a mind-
independent,  external  “cause”  of  sensations  is  indefensible  on  critical  grounds.  He
breaks  with  Kant's  denial  of  “intellectual  intuition” in  invoking the  finite  subject’s
presence to itself in two ways: theoretically as a cognizing subject and practically as a
striving moral agent.
23 Fichte’s distinction between idealism and dogmatism refutes the Kantian view of the
thing  in  itself.  For  Fichte,  taken  together  representationalism  and  constructivism
exhaust  the  possible  approaches  to  cognition.  According  to  Fichte,  though  neither
approach can refute the other, dogmatism, which relies on the thing in itself, cannot
explain experience.
24 Kant and Kantians often rely on “representation” (Vorstellung) to refer, as Heidegger
suggests, to what is present in its absence, in short reality. Fichte uses the same term in
a  different  way to  refer  to  what  is  given in  consciousness.  The  Fichtean theory  of
cognition is an account of experience understood as “The system of representations
[Vorstellungen] accompanied by the feeling of necessity,” or again what “is also called
experience….”.13 Though Fichte understands experience as a series of representations
in consciousness, he rejects a causal approach in favor of the constructivist alternative
that, according to this line of reasoning remains as the only possible approach. In other
words, he follows Kant’s view that the subject must construct the cognitive object as a
necessary condition of cognition.
25 Kant deduces a philosophical conception of the subject, which Fichte replaces through
an anthropological shift. Kant’s transcendental deduction reaches a high point in his
conception of the transcendental subject, or original synthetic unity of apperception as
“the  supreme  principle  of  all  use  of  the  understanding”.14 According  to  Kant,  the
subject, or “I think” that “must be able to accompany all my representations” is a “pure
apperception,”  not  “an  empirical  one”.15 Fichte,  on  the  contrary,  approaches  the
cognitive problem to begin with through finite human being in a social context.
26 According to Fichte, cognition depends on a subject that cannot be deduced but must
be assumed. Fichte, who understands deduction as a progression from conditioned to
condition,  hence  as  regressive,  invokes  a  pragmatic  perspective  in  contrasting
dogmatism  and  idealism.  Though  neither  can  refute  the  other,  dogmatism  cannot
explain  experience.16 The  thing  in  itself  is  an  arbitrary  assumption  that  explains
nothing,  but  through  intellectual  intuition  the  subject  perceives  itself  as  active.17
Idealism in  this  way explains  experience through intellectual  activity  based on the
necessary  laws  of  the  intellect.18 If  the  subject  is  independent  and  the  object  is
dependent, then philosophy finally depends on subjective factors, according to Fichte
on the kind of person one is.19
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6. The Fichtean subject and ontology
27 Fichte’s view of cognition based on an active but finite subject influenced Hegel, Marx,
perhaps Dewey, and others.20 Fichte’s approach to the subject as intrinsically active
further underlies his original conception of ontology.
28 In “The Aenesidemus Review,” the terminus a quo of his position, Fichte prepares the
ground for a new theory of ontology in claiming all philosophy must be traced back to a
single principle: the subject. He notes, in tacitly denying Kant’s rejection of intellectual
intuition, that what is most certain is the self, or “I am,” in adding that “all that is not-I
is for the I only.”21 Fichte’s suggestion that what is not the subject is only for it points to
a conception of reality as mind-dependent. This approach leads to a new understanding
of objectivity. In the critical philosophy, objectivity takes two incompatible forms: as
the mind-independent external object, or thing in itself, as well as the mind-dependent
cognitive object of experience and knowledge. In Fichte’s view, objectivity takes the
single  form of  what  is  experienced  in  practice  but  understood theoretically  as  the
result of the subject’s activity.
29 According to Fichte, an explanation of experience requires an account of its ground in
an object  situated  outside  the  possibility  of  experience.22 Kant’s  regressive  analysis
begins from the cognitive object in running from conditioned to condition thereof and
ending in the subject (or transcendental unity of apperception), the highest point of
transcendental  philosophy.  Fichte,  who “inverts”  the  Kantian  approach,  begins  not
from the object but from the subject –more precisely,  from the assumption that “a
finite rational being has nothing beyond experience”.23
30 Since Fichte thinks the ground of  all  experience lies  outside experience,  he,  unlike
Reinhold, rejects epistemological foundationalism as a cognitive strategy.24 His account
of “The Axioms of the Entire Science of Knowledge”25 begins in describing the task as
seeking a first axiom, which, since it is first in a series of axioms, can be neither proven
nor defined.  “Our task is  to  discover the primordial,  absolutely  unconditioned first
axiom of all human knowledge. This can be neither proved nor defined, if it is to be an
absolutely primary axiom”.26
31 The term “ground,” which for Fichte does not refer to epistemological foundationalism,
can be interpreted two ways: as the cognitive object, which, in a causal framework, is
the  cause  or  source  of  experience;  or again,  as  the  subject,  which  experiences.
According to Fichte, a finite rational being cannot cognize anything beyond the limits
of experience, for instance, what lies beyond these limits in the form of an object.27 As
for  Kant,  so  for  Fichte:  one simply  cannot  know anything about  mind-independent
reality, which lies outside experience. But for Fichte, unlike Kant, the thing in itself
plays no cognitive role.
32 Fichte’s  turn  away  from  the  Kantian  thing  in  itself  has  three  consequences.  First,
following Kant, whose precise view is unclear, in accepting epistemic constructivism he
gives up metaphysical realism for empirical  realism. It  has already been noted that
metaphysical  realism, which goes back at least to Parmenides,  runs throughout the
Western tradition and remains popular in the debate. Sophisticated thinkers continue
to believe to know means to grasp the mind-independent world as it is. Second, despite
Fichte’s retention of Kantian terminology, and despite his attention to “The Deduction
of Representation,” he abandons representation, hence representationalism.28 For Kant,
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“representation” and “appearance” are apparently synonymous terms. All appearances
are  phenomena,  but  only  some  phenomena  are  appearances.  A  phenomenon  is  an
appearance  if  and  only  if  there  is  something  that  appears.  An  appearance  is  a
representation if any and only if it successfully depicts the mind-independent world. If
one gives up the thing in itself, then one can no longer refer to reality as appearing,
since  in  this  case  experience  consists  of  phenomena  only.  In  other  words,  in  the
absence of reality understood within a causal framework, there are no representations,
since reality does not appear. Third, in ruling out a mind-independent cognitive object
as an explanatory principle, Fichte’s only remaining recourse, on pain of falling into
skepticism, is to appeal to the subject, or in his terminology, the self (das Ich).
33 The  result,  as  Fichte  quickly  points  out,  is  a  comparatively  simplified  approach  to
cognition.  In  the  Herz-letter,  Kant  suggests  an  analysis  of  the  relation  of  the
representation to the object in a triadic relationship between the subject,  the thing
itself, and the empirical object given in experience and knowledge.29 As a result of his
turn away from the thing in itself, Fichte recasts the cognitive relationship as dyadic.
34 The immediate occasion for Fichte to state the first version of his theory was provided
by  his  review  of  Schulze's  study  of  Reinhold.  Since  Schulze  used  the  pseudonym
Aenesidemus,  this  text  is  better  known  as  the  Aenesidemus-review.  In  his
Elementarphilosophie Reinhold  reformulated  the  Kantian  position  in introducing  a
principle  of  representation  (Vorstellung).  “In  consciousness  the  presentation  is
distinguished by the subject from subject and object, and related to both.”30 Schulze
objected that Reinhold had failed to observe the asymmetry in the relation of the so-
called representation to the subject and object of experience. Although representation
occurs in and is in this sense identical with the subject, it differs from the object that it
represents. In his review, Fichte endorses Schulze’s criticism, but rejects the latter’s
skeptical conclusions.
35 Fichte reformulates Reinhold’s principle as the claim that the “representation is related
to the object as an effect to its cause, and to the subject as an accident to its substance.”
31 This statement gives, in the compass of a single sentence, the outlines of an ontology
of  consciousness  based  on  two  components  only:  subject,  object,  and  their
interrelation. It is this same ontology that Fichte further develops in the initial version
of the WL and which is the basis of his entire position.
36 Fichte  justifies  his  rival  deduction  of  representation,  in  fact  a  rejection  of
representation,  by his  remark that  Kant  fails  to  prove that  representations possess
objective validity, or in other words successfully goes beyond mere appearance, and
hence fails to demonstrate his theory. Fichte’s alternative deduction presupposes inter
alia three points. First, there is nothing higher than the subject or self, which functions
as his ultimate explanatory concept.32 Second, in philosophy we must start from the
subject that cannot be deduced from something else, hence simply cannot be deduced.33
Fichte, who takes the human subject as a given, rejects the Kantian effort to deduce the
transcendental subject. Finally, in Fichte’s theory, deduction takes the form of a direct,
genetic demonstration focused on the self.34 In short, in abandoning the conception of
the thing in itself,  or the mind-independent external world as a presupposition,  he
gives up the Kantian aim of analyzing the relationship of the contents of mind to the
world in favor of a so-called “deduction” of knowledge solely from the point of view of
the subject.
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37 Fichte’s deduction, like Kant’s, is extremely complex. We need not describe it here in
detail. Suffice it to say that, starting from the hypothesis that the self, or subject, is
active, he insists on two main points: only the subject is left when all objects have been
eliminated by the power of abstraction, and the object or not-self is that from which
abstraction can be made. Either can be considered as determined by the other, and
conversely.  The  deduction  concludes  with  the  claim  that  the  subject  is  finite  (or
determined), or on the contrary, infinite, hence determining, and that in both cases it
is reciprocally related merely to itself. According to Fichte, theoretical philosophy can
go no further. In summarizing his deduction, Fichte, unlike Kant, concludes subject and
object mutually determine each other.
38 Fichte’s  turn to a  post-Kantian form of  constructivism follows from his  reaction to
Reinhold and Schulze in the Aenesidemus review. His analysis of the so-called “Axioms of
the  Entire  Science  of  Knowledge”  is  an  obviously  revised  version  of  Kant’s
transcendental  cognitive subject.  In this  first  part  of  the Wissenschaftslehre,  Fichte
distinguishes three axioms: the first, absolutely unconditioned axiom, which postulates
that the subject is solely active and never passive; the second axiom, conditioned as to
content, which is his version of the Kantian reception of sensation through the sensory
manifold; and the third axiom, conditioned as to form, which is Fichte’s restatement of
the Kantian analysis of the categorial synthesis of the sensory contents as a cognizable
object.
 
7. On Fichte’s deduction
39 Fichte’s deduction of representation (Vorstellung) is clearly intended to replace Kant’s
transcendental deduction. His deduction identifies the cognitive subject, object as well
as their interrelation. Fichte suggests that the subject’s consciousness (of the cognitive
object) as well as its self-consciousness are both explicable through the supposition of
its activity through which it constructs both the object as well as itself in objectified
form.  Since  Fichte’s  analysis  is  perhaps  unduly  complex,  for  present  purposes  a
reconstruction of some main points will suffice.
40 Fichte begins from a logical proposition, which he takes as true and then later deduces
through an obviously circular argument. According to Fichte, logical identity (A = A),
which is absolutely  certain,  is  not  as  an  existential  claim  but  rather  a  necessary
connection. The statement “I am I” as absolutely valid, since in any explanation of the
basis of empirical consciousness the self (das Ich)—again, his name for the subject--is
presupposed. The activity of the human mind, which is supposedly both the agent and
the product of action, or again its origin and its result, is position. According to Fichte,
“action and deed are one and the same”.35 Fichte here is building on Descartes. The “I
am,” which for Descartes is an existential claim, for Fichte “expresses an Act” (ibid.).
Fichte’s self is an absolute subject, which posits that itself and the finite self exist only
as self-consciousness. It follows that A = A amounts to the claim that the self posits
itself absolutely, since this applies to reality.
41 Fichte  situates  his  view of  the  self  as  the  source  of  all  reality  with  respect  to  the
ongoing  debate.  He  thinks  his  view  has  affinities  with  the  Cartesian  cogito and
Reinhold’s principle of representation. He further thinks his view was adopted earlier
in Kant’s transcendental deduction. The object is the result of, hence identical with, the
subject’s activity, and any object is no more nor less than the subject in external form.
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42 Fichte  continues  his  analysis  in  an  account  of  the  second  axiom,  which,  like  its
predecessor, cannot be proven, and also cannot be derived from the first axiom. The
overall  account  serves  to  identify  the  cognitive  object  from the  perspective  of  the
subject, hence not as it supposedly is, in beginning, as for the first axiom, with a fact of
empirical consciousness.
43 The analysis of the second axiom follows that of the first axiom. According to Fichte,
though it cannot be proven, everyone will accept the proposition that ~A≠ A. It follows
that the absolute and unconditional opposition, which is a fact given in consciousness,
must simply be posited. Fichte further observes that counter-positing is possible only
on the basis of positing, or the identity of the self. This point establishes the priority of
the subject over the object, which is possible only through the opposition to, or rather
the negation of, the subject. Yet the subject and object, or the self and what opposes it,
are  not  only  different  but  also  unified,  since  opposition  presupposes  the  unity  of
consciousness. In other words, ontological difference rests on cognitive unity. From the
perspective of the subject, the not-self, or object, is merely what is opposed to the self,
or subject. In sum, the proposition “I am” is equivalent to A = A, and ~A ≠ A, or the
principle of opposition, which presupposes negation.
44 Fichte has so far sketched the basis of a novel form of subject-object ontology from the
subject’s angle of vision. The first axiom, in following Kant’s transcendental unity of
apperception,  asserts  the  centrality  of  subjectivity.  The  second  axiom  describes
sensation, or formless content, through the subject. In his account of the third axiom,
conditioned as to form, Fichte restates Kant’s Copernican view that we know only what
we construct through an account of the interaction between the other two axioms.
45 In this passage, Fichte restates in many different ways his central insight in stressing
his resolutely first-person perspective. According to Fichte, this interaction must be
understood  from the  perspective  of  a  subject  that  is  theoretically  unlimited  but
practically limited by its surroundings.
46 The analysis is divided into three parts (A, B, C). In part A, Fichte suggests that the
subject and object are opposed. In part B, he describes his task as discovering, on the
basis  of  an  act  of  the  mind  (Y),  the  relation  between  subject  and  object (X)  that
preserves the identity of consciousness. The obvious answer is that subject and object
limit each other in virtue of what Fichte calls their “divisibility.” This is an early form
of what later becomes a theory of dialectical interaction between human individuals in
a social context. In part C, Fichte examines his proposed solution. According to Fichte,
consciousness contains the whole of reality; that is, insofar as reality is not attributed
to the object, subject and object are posited within the subject. In other words, the
context or surroundings are known through the interaction with the subject on the
level of consciousness and from which they are inseparable. Fichte suggests that it is
possible to bring together subject and object in an account of knowledge if and only if
we  take  into  account  synthesis,  or  counter-positing,  and  the  so-called  act  of
combination. In that case, subject and object can be understood as interacting from the
angle of vision of the subject.  In other words, he appears to be trying to grasp the
cognitive subject as simultaneously limited and unlimited by its surroundings, and on
that basis to understand knowledge as arising in the interaction between the subject
and object, leading to consciousness.
47 Since  the  third  axiom concerns  synthesis,  Fichte  regards  his  account  as  answering
Kant’s  question  about  the  possibility  of  synthetic  a  priori  judgments.  According  to
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Fichte, all syntheses are rooted in the interrelation between subject and object. Further
according to Fichte, his revised version of the critical philosophy turns on the view of
the  absolute  self  as  “wholly  unconditioned  and  incapable  of  determination  by  any
higher thing”.36 Since a philosophy that opposes anything to the subject is dogmatic, or
not critical, Fichte sharply rejects the Kantian conception of reality, or the thing in
itself,  as  inconsistent  with  the  critical  philosophy  and  akin  to  Spinozism,  which
grounds consciousness in a substance. As a further consequence of rejecting the thing
in itself, he also rejects Kant’s effort to combine both subjective and objective sources
in a single cognitive approach. In short, Fichte thinks that Kant inconsistently relies on
a mind-independent noumenon that is incompatible with the critical philosophy. This
suggests that Kant is finally a dogmatist and that Fichte’s revision is the initial version
of  a  view that  is  finally  consistent  with Kant’s  position.  On Fichte’s  reading of  the
critical philosophy, the cognitive object –hence experience– must be explained solely
from  the  perspective  of  the  subject.  According  to  Fichte,  for  whom  the  only  two
possible approaches are criticism and dogmatism, Kant inconsistently seeks to straddle
this  unbridgeable  divide.  For  Fichte,  who  follows  a  strict  reading  of  the  critical
philosophy, it is not possible to go beyond the subject.
 
8. Conclusion: Fichte, the subject and cognition
48 A summary of the Fichtean view of the subject which emerges from his reaction to Kant
and others in the contemporary debate through this complicated train of reasoning can
now  be  rapidly  sketched.  Fichte,  who  like  Kant  begins  with  the  problem  of  the
conditions of knowledge and experience, considers the finite human subject from two
perspectives. As a finite human being, a person is both a theoretical entity, namely, a
subject of consciousness, who is unlimited, and a practical, or limited moral, being. As a
real finite being, the individual is limited through the relation to the external world.
Fichte further invokes the concept of  absolute being on the philosophical  or  meta-
experiential level, as a philosophical concept useful in the explanation of experience. 
49 To the types of finite human being or so-called self (das Ich) Fichte associates kinds of
activity. As theoretical an individual posits, as practical he strives, and as absolute he
acts in theoretical independence of his surroundings. The concept of an ideally existent
absolute  being  is  justified  as  a  means  to  understand  the  experience  of  the  really
existent finite being. Forms of activity need to be subtended on the theoretical plane by
activity in general, and from the side of realism a finite human being is above all a
practical  being.  But  from the  idealistic  perspective,  the  concept  of  pure  activity  is
identified with the absolute self, an acknowledged philosophical construct in Fichte's
discussion. Yet, since from this perspective a view of finite human being follows from
the  concept  of  absolute  self,  Fichte  may  be  said  to  “deduce”  the  concept  of  the
individual from that of the absolute. As he notes in a letter: “My absolute self is clearly
not the individual […]. But the individual must be deduced from the absolute self.”37
50 Fichte’s  rethinking of  the  subject  removes  the  ambiguity  in  the  critical  philosophy
about  the  status  of  the  noumenon,  or  mind-independent  real,  which  Kant
inconsistently  describes  as  uncognizable  but  as  also  indispensable  for  cognition.
Fichte’s shift to cognitive explanation from the perspective of subjectivity or the finite
human subject overcomes some problems in the critical philosophy, but leads to others.
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51 An  obvious  difficulty  in  the  Fichtean  position  results  from  the  anthropological
reformulation of the subject that reinstates the psychologistic concern that Kant is at
pains to avoid. An important virtue of Fichte’s reformulation of the critical philosophy
lies in its effort to remove the basic ambiguity in the critical philosophy due to its
simultaneous commitment to epistemic representationalism as well  as  metaphysical
realism, on the one hand, and epistemic constructivism and empirical realism on the
other.
52 This  point  can  be  explained  in  referring  to  the  triple  distinction  between  a
phenomenon, an appearance, and a representation. In simple terms, a phenomenon is
simply given to consciousness but does not refer beyond itself, an appearance is given
to consciousness and further refers beyond itself but does not necessarily represent or
correctly depict that to which it refers, and a representation refers to and correctly
depicts that to which it refers beyond itself.
53 Now Kant, whose position evolved in the writing of the first Critique, is simultaneously
committed in his treatise to incompatible cognitive theories. In simplest terms he is
both  a  representationalist  and  an  anti-representationalist  or  again  an  anti-
representational  epistemic  constructivist.  On  the  one  hand,  he  is  committed  to
epistemic representationalism, or the view that to know requires a causal account, or
more precisely a reverse, anti-Platonic inference from the appearance to what appears,
hence a representation of reality. On the other hand, since, as he says, there has never
been any progress toward grasping a mind-independent object, he is committed as an
alternative to the view that we can base cognition on epistemic constructivism, or the
construction of the mind-dependent object.
54 Plato is a cognitive anti-representationalist, who rejects the backward causal inference
from  effect  cause  in  favor  of  intellectual  intuition  of  reality.  Modern  philosophy
reverses the Platonic rejection of the backward causal inference in featuring it in a
series of efforts to demonstrate epistemic representation of the mind-independent real.
Epistemic representation of the real, which is on the agenda at least since Parmenides,
is  often  asserted  but  as  Kant  indicated  has  never  been  demonstrated.  Hegel,  for
instance, points to Kant’s inability to explain the relation between uncognizable reality
and the cognitive subject, or in other words the inability to explain the unbridgeable
gap between ourselves and cognition, subjectivity and objectivity, thought and being,
the knower and the known.38
55 Fichte  rejects  Kantian  representationalism  in  criticizing  a  causal  approach  to
knowledge.  Fichte’s  enormous  contribution  lies  in  rejecting  the  representationalist
causal  model,  hence  in  removing  the  inconsistency  in  Kant’s  simultaneous  but
inconsistent  commitment  to  two  rival  views  of  cognition  in  restating  the  Kantian
epistemic constructivist model on the basis of the subject’s activity. In this way, Fichte
sets the agenda running throughout post-Kantian German idealism that consists in an
effort  to  restate  the  a  priori  Kantian  constructivist  approach  to  cognition  in  an
acceptable a posteriori form.
56 Fichte’s  view of  cognition  is,  however,  deeply  problematic.  His  solution  consists  in
replacing the dualism of subjectivity and objectivity through the single explanatory
theme of subjectivity. This improves on Kant’s third person account of the relation of
subject  to  object  in  an  account  from  the  first  person  perspective  of  experience  in
Fichte’s technical sense of the term. Yet in revealing the limits of a quasi-Cartesian
approach to objectivity through subjectivity, he reduces objectivity to subjectivity so to
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speak. Modern philosophy features the view that the road to objectivity runs through
subjectivity.  The  difficulty  lies  in  understanding  how  to  combine  subjectivity  and
objectivity  within  a  single  cognitive  theory.  I  conclude  that,  though  Fichte  clearly
improves  on  Kant,  he  fails  to  solve  the  basic  Cartesian  problem  of  the  relation  of
subjectivity to objectivity within cognition, a problem that has never been solved.
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ABSTRACTS
This paper will consider the nature and explanatory limits of the Fichtean view of subjectivity in
the  epistemic  context  of  German idealism.  I  will  argue  that  Fichte’s  revision of  the  Kantian
conception of the subject is both a basic contribution to the cognitive problem as well as fatally
flawed, hence not a viable solution to the cognitive problem. Fichte’s distinctive revision of the
Kantian  subject  goes  too  far  in  making  the  objective  overly,  even wholly  dependent  on  the
subjective  dimension.  After  Kant  and  after  Fichte  we  still  lack  an  effective  solution  for  the
problem of cognition.
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